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Concluding remarks 
A transnational coordinated reconstruction of 
collective bargaining as a precondition for 
inclusive growth in Europe
Thorsten Schulten and Guy Van Gyes
‘Europe has learned many lessons from the recent fi nancial and economic 
crisis. We see very clearly now that in a highly integrated Union, and even 
more so in a monetary union, our economies and our successes are linked. 
Although the EU has a number of instruments for the co-ordination of eco-
nomic policy the crisis has shown that they have not been used to the full and 
that there are gaps in the current governance system. There is broad political 
agreement that this has to change and that the EU needs to be equipped with 
a broader and more effective set of policy instruments to ensure its future 
prosperity and standards of living.’
European Commission: 
Enhancing economic policy coordination for stability, growth and jobs – 
Tools for stronger EU economic governance COM(2010) 367/2 
‘I regard the growth of collective bargaining as essential. I approve minimum 
wage and hours regulation. I was altogether on your side the other day, when 
you deprecated a policy of general wage reductions as useless in present 
circumstances.’
John Maynard Keynes in a letter to 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1 February 1938
The focus of the present book is the recent policy shift in European eco-
nomic governance in which wages and wage formation systems are un-
der attack. The book has: (i) evaluated and critically reviewed the policy 
theory backing this new policy approach; (ii) assessed its impact; and 
(iii) outlined and argued for another view on the role wages and collec-
tive bargaining can play in a more productive and sustainable EU socio-
economic perspective. The book takes as its starting point the strategy of 
inclusive growth embraced (in principle) by Europe, which is – accord-
ing to many observers – key to a productive and sustainable European 
socio-economic approach.
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1. Current views on wage bargaining under the new 
European Economic Governance
Strong unions and comprehensive collective bargaining within the 
framework of which the majority of workers are protected by collective 
agreements have been widely regarded as a cornerstone of the European 
social model, as it developed in the fi rst two decades after the Second 
World War in many western European countries (Visser 2013), thereby 
delivering a ‘golden age’ of inclusive growth. Strong unions were seen 
as a necessary countervailing power against the more destructive ten-
dencies of capitalism, while comprehensive collective bargaining was 
regarded as the core institution for promoting a more equal distribution 
of income as a major precondition for sustainable and inclusive growth. 
Along those lines the European Commission (2015: 3) even recently ar-
gued, in the latest Industrial Relations Report of DG Employment, that 
‘countries with strong social dialogue institutions are among the EU’s 
best performing and most competitive economies, with a better and 
more resilient social situation’.
In contrast, however, a counterview has become more and more infl uen-
tial among European policymakers during the past three decades. With 
strong mainstream academic support and promotion by neoliberal in-
terests this counterview regards unions and collective bargaining mainly 
as institutional rigidities that hinder ‘effi cient market allocation’. Conse-
quently, there is a more or less open demand for a ‘decrease’ in collective 
bargaining coverage and an ‘overall reduction in the wage-setting power 
of trade unions’, as pointed out a few years ago in the already famous DG 
ECFIN report on ‘Labour Market Developments in Europe’ (European 
Commission 2012: 104).
Within the framework of the new European economic governance, neo-
liberal views on wages and collective bargaining have become even more 
prominent and have guided various policy reforms and interventions. As 
the crisis in Europe came to be interpreted largely as a crisis of competi-
tiveness, wages were seen as the core adjustment variable for ‘internal 
devaluation’, which are supposed to restore competitiveness by reducing 
labour costs. Although all policy interventions on wages and collective 
bargaining ultimately take place at national level, they have very much 
been promoted through European economic governance procedures 
(European Semester and Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure). In the 
case of countries under the European Stability Mechanism these inter-
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ventions have been imposed in a more authoritarian and fairly undem-
ocratic way by the ‘Troika’ (the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund).
The new political interventionism in the area of wage policy basically 
takes two forms (Schulten and Müller 2015). First, many countries have 
directly intervened in current wage developments through wage cuts and 
freezes in the public sector, but sometimes also in the private sector with 
more or less open violations of collective bargaining autonomy. Second, 
in many countries the state has promoted ‘structural reforms’ of collec-
tive bargaining and wage-setting systems. These reforms, which were 
usually imposed against the resistance of trade unions and sometimes 
even of employers’ associations, have aimed at a more radical decen-
tralisation of collective bargaining in order to increase downward wage 
fl exibility at company level. 
As a result, a considerable diminution of multi-employer agreements 
and collective bargaining coverage have been witnessed, especially in 
southern countries such as Portugal and Spain (see Chapter 3 in this 
volume). Besides limited exceptions (for example, Slovenia), this policy 
framework has also been dominant for a while in the catch-up countries 
of central and eastern Europe. A low-wage economic strategy is embed-
ded in a non-developing or receding context of institutionalised collec-
tive bargaining, occasionally interrupted by (tripartite) political settle-
ments to increase minimum wages (Chapter 5). As such, these policies 
refl ect the trend of dismantling collective bargaining in the United King-
dom since the 1980s (Chapter 6). Low-wage competition has also been 
introduced in the political debate in the Nordic countries, as Chapter 4 
of this volume shows. On one hand, German wage ‘leadership’ has led 
to the heightened adoption of organised decentralisation bargaining in 
Denmark and Sweden. On the other hand, liberalising labour mobility 
has led to social dumping in sectors such as construction, transport and 
food industry.
2. The failure of internal devaluation 
As a direct result of this new European and national interventionism in 
wage policy, a series of countries – in particular in eastern and south-
ern Europe – have faced a signifi cant decline in real wages, as well as a 
strong increase in wage inequality. The economic consequences of these 
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wage developments have been negative. Although many countries were 
– at least on paper – able to improve their cost competitiveness by re-
ducing unit labour costs, this did not lead to the hoped-for export-led 
recovery (Le Bayon et al.  2014; Uxó et al.  2014). In contrast, the decline 
in real wages had a strong negative effect on the development of domes-
tic demand and thus contributed to the persistence of economic stagna-
tion and high unemployment. Moreover, as many European countries 
have followed the same strategy of wage restraint in an already stagnat-
ing economic environment, this has largely contributed to a decline in 
price development and has put the threat of a Europe-wide defl ation on 
the agenda.
The failure of internal devaluation calls into question the dominant 
mainstream narrative of the economic crisis in Europe and its underly-
ing assumptions regarding the role of wages (Chapter 7 in this volume). 
First of all, there is a widespread view that the countries that are still suf-
fering from the crisis basically have a problem of weak competitiveness 
which in the past was exacerbated by ‘too high’ wage increases. Turning 
to real wage developments and productivity increases, however, wage 
restraint has been ongoing in the 2000s almost everywhere in Europe, 
leading to a signifi cant fall in the wage share and a redistribution from 
labour to capital (Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013). 
Secondly, there is often no clear correlation between unit labour cost de-
velopments and export performance, as the latter depends fi rst of all on 
export demand. Moreover, competitiveness is not only about costs but 
also about a wide range of non-price factors, such as innovation, quality, 
originality, brand image and services, as well as sectoral specialisation. 
According to recent scholarship these non-price competitiveness factors 
are much more able to explain the export performance of a country than 
the narrow view based on wages and labour costs (for example, Storm 
and Naastepad 2015). Consequently, the development of export indus-
tries cannot be promoted by wage restraint, but only by a more specifi c 
structural and industrial policy, as well as by a modern and effi cient pub-
lic infrastructure.
Finally, there is a narrow focus on an export-led strategy as a supposed 
‘royal road’ to economic recovery. Such a perspective is highly problem-
atic for at least two reasons: fi rst of all, it is simply physically impossi-
ble that all countries could follow an export-led development model and 
rely on running a trade surplus. Export-led development strategies that 
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attempt to defy this fundamental truth are likely to result in senseless 
downward competition among countries on issues such as wages, social 
security contributions and tax. Apart from that, however, the focus on 
export-led development strategies largely ignores the fact that in almost 
all European countries most economic activities still take place in the do-
mestic economy (Feigl and Zuckerstätter 2012). Under such conditions 
possible positive effects of wage restraint with regard to the price com-
petitiveness of export industries will usually be offset by the negative ef-
fects on private demand, so that the overall consequences for economic 
growth will be negative. A typical example of this was Germany during 
the 2000s, when both wages and private demand grew well below the 
European average (Schulten 2015).
3. An alternative view of wages for more inclusive 
economic development
During the 2000s wage developments in most European countries were 
characterised by falling wage shares and growing wage dispersion (see 
Chapter 2 in this volume). As a consequence, wage-led private demand 
systematically lagged behind and hindered these economies in realising 
their growth potential. In order to compensate this structural demand 
gap, two different economic models have emerged in Europe. One is an 
export-led growth model (followed by most northern European coun-
tries) where weak domestic demand came to be at least partially com-
pensated by growing trade surpluses. The other was a debt-led growth 
model (followed by many southern European countries) which promot-
ed a domestic demand boom based on private debt rather than income. 
With the crisis it became clear that both models – which depend on each 
other – are not sustainable (Hein 2012).
Under the conditions of the crisis the problem of weak demand was at 
fi rst further exacerbated as many countries not only followed a policy of 
strict ‘austerity’, but also saw a signifi cant fall in real wages. In the mean-
time, it has become more and more obvious that these policies promoted 
by the new European economic governance procedures have failed to 
create a way out of economic stagnation, so that a growing number of 
political and economic actors are demanding that these policies be re-
nounced. Besides the necessary shift from austerity to more investment, 
there is also a need for a strong shift in wage policy. As the Director for 
Employment, Labour and Social Affairs at the OECD, Stefano Scarpetta, 
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has put it: ‘Any further reduction of wages risks being counter-produc-
tive because then we would run into a vicious circle of defl ation, lower 
consumption and lower investment’ (quoted in Financial Times, 3 Sep-
tember 2014, see also OECD 2014a).
An alternative economic development model based neither on increas-
ing private debts nor on increasing trade surpluses requires a much more 
equal distribution of income and wealth in order to solve the demand 
problem. A more sustainable growth strategy could therefore only be an 
inclusive growth strategy; at least on paper this became the offi cial guid-
ing principle of the Europe 2020 strategy (European Commission 2010). 
As the OECD (2004b) put it, inclusive growth aims to ‘take all on board’, 
in order to make sure that all people can gain from economic develop-
ment. There is a fairly broad consensus that an inclusive growth strategy 
basically needs to reverse the ongoing trend towards growing inequality 
of income and wealth. However, the role of wage policy in such an inclu-
sive growth model has so far been largely neglected. This is even more 
astonishing because wages are still the major source of income for most 
people and as such the main source for private demand. 
An inclusive growth strategy requires a supportive wage policy which 
goes beyond the traditional ‘golden wage rule’ according to which wages 
should grow in line with national trend productivity and target infl ation 
rate. A new ‘optimum wage regime’ in Europe, as suggested by Chagny 
and Husson (Chapter 9 in this volume), calls for wage developments that 
are solidaristic in the sense that they avoid increasing wage differentials 
between the various sectors and lift up wages at the lower end of the 
scale. Moreover, wage developments should be allowed – at least for a 
certain period – to be more expansive in order to reverse the downward 
trend in wage shares. As recent studies have shown, more expansive and 
solidaristic wage developments in Europe could contribute to a signifi -
cant push in growth and investment (Onaran and Obst 2015; Kelly and 
D’Arcy 2015).
4. Institutional preconditions for a more expansive and 
solidaristic wage policy 
A shift in the current economic development model in Europe towards 
a more wage-led and inclusive growth model needs institutions that are 
able to support such an alternative strategy (Berg et al.  2015). As far as 
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wage-setting and collective bargaining are concerned, however, recent 
‘structural reforms’ promoted within the framework of the new Europe-
an economic governance have led to the paradoxical situation in which 
more macroeconomic-oriented coordination of wages becomes less and 
less possible (see Chapter 8 in this volume).
With the more radical decentralisation or even individualisation of wage-
setting, wage developments tend to follow the business cycle closely and 
thus to promote pro-cyclical economic development. While in times of 
economic downturn more decentralised systems indeed show much 
greater downward wage fl exibility, in periods of economic upswing they 
might lead to much faster wage growth. In any case, more decentralised 
wage-setting systems generate much higher wage dispersion as wage de-
velopments depend highly on the economic performance of individual 
fi rms.
In contrast, it was one of the basic insights of Keynesian economics that, 
especially in times of economic crisis, strong wage institutions are nec-
essary in order to prevent a downward development of wages and to 
maintain their role as economic stabilisers. Keynes (1936: 14) himself 
even claimed in his General Theory that ‘it is fortunate that the work-
ers, though unconsciously, are instinctively more reasonable economists 
than the classical school, inasmuch as they resist reductions of money-
wages’.
Today, support for more inclusive economic development in Europe re-
quires not only the prevention of further wage cuts and freezes, but also 
a more coordinated approach to more expansive and solidaristic wage 
developments. A macroeconomic coordination of wage policy, however, 
is possible only with adequate wage-setting institutions that make it 
possible to set wages beyond the scope of the individual fi rm. What are 
needed are basically three elements: adequate minimum wages, encom-
passing collective bargaining and strong trade unions.
Regarding minimum wages all European countries have determined 
more or less universal wage fl oors. In addition, in many countries – es-
pecially those with fairly weak collective bargaining – the development 
of statutory minimum wages has an important signalling function for 
wage development overall. However, the level of minimum wages is of-
ten fairly low and not able to prevent poverty. Against that background, 
a European-wide coordinated minimum wage policy would have the task 
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of ensuring decent wages for all workers (Chapter 10 in this volume). It 
would have to promote above-average wage increases at the lower end of 
the wage scale and thus encourage a signifi cant push of private demand. 
As calculated by Eurofound, an increase in all minimum wages to 60 per 
cent of the respective national median wage would benefi t about 16 per 
cent of all workers in Europe (Aumayr-Pintar et al.  2014). 
Regarding collective bargaining, the situation in Europe is diverse (Eu-
ropean Commission 2015). Collective bargaining coverage varies among 
countries between almost 100 per cent and only around 10 per cent. High 
bargaining coverage, with the majority of workers covered by collective 
agreements, requires a comprehensive system of more centralised mul-
ti-employer bargaining (Chapter 8 in this volume). Furthermore, it usu-
ally also needs supportive regulation by the state, for example, through 
the widespread use of collective agreement extensions. Instead of weak-
ening or even destroying multi-employer bargaining structures, the EU 
should, together with European trade unions and employers’ associa-
tions, launch a broad campaign to strengthen collective bargaining and 
increase bargaining coverage (Chapter 11 in this volume).
Finally, industrial relations researchers have long known and even econ-
omists of the International Monetary Fund (Jaumotte and Buitron 2015) 
have recently confi rmed that a more inclusive growth model based on a 
more egalitarian distribution of incomes requires much stronger trade 
unions. Although it is fi rst of all the task of the unions themselves to 
increase their organisational power base and to reverse the trend of fall-
ing union density, it is also society’s responsibility to enable and support 
the development of strong trade unions. All in all, a shift towards a more 
sustainable and inclusive economic development model would require 
a broad-based reconstruction of collective bargaining as part of a more 
fundamental renewal of industrial democracy in Europe.
Institutional restoration would also contribute to a better European gov-
ernance strategy. Despite the lip service to social dialogue, the approach 
adopted by Europe in recent years has been hampered by democratic 
defi ciencies, as refl ected in the social protests in southern countries and 
the growing legitimacy problems of the European project.
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5. Challenge of transnational coordination (capacity)
A basic premise of this volume is that, in these times of globalisation 
and crisis, Europe needs an inclusive growth strategy that focuses on re-
ducing inequality and enhancing real income growth among a broad(er) 
group of people (the ‘99%’) than today. Restoring and supporting collec-
tive bargaining on wages is defi ned as a key factor in this strategy.
Finally, it is important to stress the transnational coordination challenge. 
Successful combination of both elements is key: coordination as govern-
ance method and at supra-national level in Europe. The main advantage 
of collective wage bargaining in the proposed strategy (as illustrated in 
this volume) is the coordinating effort that would act as a ‘counterforce’ 
against market forces, which are simply not delivering. The analyses of 
the book show that, on one hand, we are already witnessing this kind of 
European transnational coordination. However, it is politically imposed 
and does not promote, but rather distorts the necessary market-correct-
ing function of wage bargaining institutions. It shows, also, that in such 
a policy context in the countries in which collective bargaining has re-
mained in fairly good shape (mainly north-western Europe), trends of 
wage moderation, freezes and beggar-thy-neighbour policies have been 
dominant. Strengthening national institutions is necessary, but will 
probably not be suffi cient to diffuse the outlined ‘policy turn’ in Europe. 
Structural innovations in ‘vertical’ coordination at European level will be 
very important for success. Before starting a discussion on the needed 
changes in the governance structures of the European macroeconomic 
social dialogue or the functioning of bipartite – sectoral and cross-secto-
ral – social dialogue, it is important, in our opinion, to have a clear view 
on the following matters, which at the moment are still very ‘open’ policy 
questions.
The proposed restoration requires a broadening of horizontal subsidiari-
ty at the European level, in which trade unions and employers’ associa-
tions are given the chance to address the wage-related challenges of an 
inclusive growth strategy, for which they are better placed to fi nd negoti-
ated solutions. However, experience of social market implementation in 
Europe shows that in many countries policies have to be developed by 
means of a ‘carrot and stick approach’ to make horizontal subsidiarity 
deliver (Visser 2013: 56). What innovative and positive role can the Eu-
ropean semester approach play in this regard?
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Successful growth strategies depend on complementarities, as the litera-
ture on political economy has shown convincingly (Morgan et al.  2010). 
The main driver of the neoliberal approach that currently dominates in 
Europe is fi nance-led capitalism (Hein 2012). Just as this fi nance-led 
strategy strongly affects the kind of wage bargaining that takes place, a 
wage-led strategy will have to think and act on the complementarities 
needed in the fi nancial economy.
European debates are still very strongly driven by the cost perspective of 
export sectors. We have already questioned the cost perspective in this 
conclusion, but it is equally important to broaden debates on wages at 
the European level to the more shielded service sectors. The stories of 
labour mobility dumping in the Nordic countries in Chapter 4 and the 
detected ‘imbalances’ in the service sector mentioned in Chapter 9 hint 
at this necessity.
6. En avant!
Building blocks have been offered in this book for constructing an al-
ternative view of wage bargaining under the new European Economic 
Governance today. Pressing questions have been outlined that seek a po-
litical answer. Mobilising capacity for the strategy is another important 
step in this regard (Hyman 2015). An important role and responsibil-
ity should be given in this campaign to the European labour movement 
(ETUC and sectoral federations), because, as we have indicated, the ‘pol-
icy turn’ needs to be transnationally coordinated or it will not take place. 
Aggregating interests in a solidaristic way beyond national borders is the 
fi rst fundamental challenge of such strategic union campaigns, while the 
second is a search for coalition partners.
Concluding remarks
 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance 411
References
Aumayr-Pintar C. et al.  (2014) Pay in Europe in the 21st century, Dublin, Euro-
found.
Berg J. (ed.) (2015) Labour Markets, Institutions and Inequality. Building Just 
Societies in the 21st Century, Edward Elgar.
European Commission (2010) Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020, Brussels, 3.3.2010.
European Commission (2012) Labour Market Developments in Europe 2012, Eu-
ropean Economy No. 5. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_fi nance/publications/ 
european_economy/2012/pdf/ee-2012-5_en.pdf
European Commission (2015) Industrial Relations in Europe 2014, Luxembourg, 
Publications Offi  ce of the European Union.
Feigl G. and Zuckerstätter S. (2012) Wettbewerbs(des)orientierung, AK Wien (ed.), 
Materialien zu Wirtschaft  und Gesellschaft  No. 117, Wien.
Hein E. (2012) The Macroeconomics of Finance-Dominated Capitalism – and Its 
Crisis, Edward Elgar. 
Hyman R. (2015) Three scenarios for industrial relations in Europe, International 
Labour Review, 154 (1), 5–14.
Jaumotte F. and Buitron C.O. (2015) Power from the people, IMF Finance & De-
velopment, March, 29–31.
Kelly G. and D’Arcy C. (eds) (2015) Securing a pay rise: the path back to shared 
wage growth, London, Resolution Foundation.
Keynes J.M. (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, 
London, Macmillan.
Lavoie M. and Stockhammer E. (eds) (2013) Wage-Led Growth: An Equitable 
Strategy for Economic Recovery, Palgrave Macmillian/ILO.
Le Bayon S., Plane M. , Riffl  art C. and Sampognaro R. (2014) La Dévaluation par 
les Salaires dans la Zone Euro: Un Adjustement pendant-pendant, Revue de 
l’OFCE No. 136, 255–291.
Morgan G. et al.  (eds) (2010) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional 
Analysis. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
OECD (2014a) Sharing the pain equally? Wage adjustments during the crisis and 
recovery, OECD Employment Outlook 2014, Paris, OECD, 43–78.
OECD (2014b) All on board, Making inclusive growth happen, OECD, Paris.
Onaran O. and Obst T. (2015) Wage-led growth in the EU15 Member States. 
The eff ects of income distribution on growth, investment, trade balance, 
and infl ation, Report for the Foundation for European Progressive Studies 
(FEPS). http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/19c9c5a8-e57b-4c6e-9fcd-
14cce163335f/wage-led-growth-study-onaran-obst-20052015compressed-
1pdf.pdf
Thorsten Schulten and Guy Van Gyes
412 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance
Schulten T. (2015) Wages, Competitiveness and Germany’s Export-led Develop-
ment Model, in Unger B. (ed.) The German Model – Seen by its Neighbours, 
Social Europe Publishing, 147–160.
Schulten T. and Müller T. (2015) European economic governance and its interven-
tion in national wage development and collective bargaining, in Lehndorff  S. 
(ed.) Divisive integration: The triumph of failed ideas in Europe – revisited, 
Brussels, ETUI, 331–363.
Storm S. and Naastepad C.W.M. (2015) Europe’s Hunger Games: Income Distribu-
tion, Cost Competitiveness and Crisis, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 39 (3), 
959–986.
Uxó J., Paúl J. and Febrero E. (2014) Internal devaluation in the European 
periphery: the story of a failure, UCLM Working Papers DT 2014/2. http://
www.uclm.es/dep/daef/DOCUMENTOS%20DE%20TRABAJO/DT-
2014/2014-2%20DT-DAEF.pdf
Visser J. (2013) Wage bargaining institutions: from crisis to crisis, Economic 
Papers No. 488, European Commission.
